Files
crewli/api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/LoginController.php
bert.hausmans 2e94a107e4 refactor(auth): consolidate to single cookie post single-SPA
The dual-cookie machinery (crewli_app_token + crewli_portal_token,
Origin-based resolution) was load-bearing only when the second SPA
existed. apps/portal/ was deleted in WS-3 PR-B1; the resolver code
has been carrying dead branches since then. Collapse to one cookie.

Cookie name retained as crewli_app_token — no session breakage on
deploy. crewli_portal_token is fully purged from the server-side.

CookieBearerToken middleware:
- COOKIE_NAMES array → single COOKIE_NAME constant
- resolveCookieName method (Origin/Referer parsing, host+port
  matching against frontend_app_url/frontend_portal_url) → removed
- Body collapses to: skip if Authorization header present; else
  read crewli_app_token cookie and inject Bearer header

SetAuthCookie trait:
- COOKIE_MAP / resolveCookieName / originMatches → removed
- makeAuthCookie / forgetAuthCookie now take only $token; the
  cookie name is the trait's private constant

Five callers updated to drop the resolveCookieName($request) line
and the cookie-name argument: LoginController (3 sites),
MfaVerifyController (1 site), AuthRefreshController (1 site),
LogoutController (1 site), InvitationController (1 site — caller
list in the prompt missed this one but the same pattern applies).

frontend_portal_url config key retained (per Phase A directive Q1):
EmailChangeController, PasswordResetController, PersonController are
non-auth consumers that build per-app URL maps for outbound emails.
The map structure is now functionally redundant (production resolves
all FRONTEND_* env vars to the same host) but stays structurally
intact. Refactor tracked as TECH-FRONTEND-URL-CONSOLIDATE in the
upcoming docs commit.

HttpOnlyCookieAuthTest:
- Removed 4 dual-cookie tests (login_sets_portal_cookie_for_portal_origin,
  app_cookie_does_not_authenticate_portal_requests,
  portal_cookie_does_not_authenticate_app_requests,
  correct_cookie_authenticates_with_matching_origin)
- Renamed login_sets_app_cookie_for_unknown_origin →
  login_sets_app_cookie_regardless_of_origin; expanded to four
  Origin variants (none, app, unknown, foreign) — pins the new
  origin-agnostic contract
- Removed Origin headers from request calls in remaining tests
  (now meaningless)

Backend test count: 1491 → 1487 (-4 deleted, dual-cookie tests
encoding the obsolete contract). Pint clean. Larastan clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-06 00:24:01 +02:00

108 lines
3.8 KiB
PHP

<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Http\Controllers\Api\V1;
use App\Enums\MfaMethod;
use App\Http\Controllers\Api\V1\Traits\SetAuthCookie;
use App\Http\Controllers\Controller;
use App\Http\Requests\Api\V1\LoginRequest;
use App\Http\Resources\Api\V1\MeResource;
use App\Models\User;
use App\Services\MfaService;
use Illuminate\Http\JsonResponse;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Hash;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Log;
final class LoginController extends Controller
{
use SetAuthCookie;
public function __construct(
private MfaService $mfaService,
) {}
public function __invoke(LoginRequest $request): JsonResponse
{
// Validate credentials WITHOUT creating a session.
// Auth::attempt() must NOT be used here — it establishes a Laravel
// session, which could grant access before MFA verification.
$user = User::where('email', $request->validated('email'))->first();
if (! $user || ! Hash::check($request->validated('password'), $user->password)) {
Log::warning('Failed login attempt', [
'email' => $request->validated('email'),
'ip' => $request->ip(),
'user_agent' => $request->userAgent(),
]);
return $this->unauthorized('Invalid credentials');
}
// MFA enabled and confirmed — check trusted device or require MFA
if ($user->mfa_enabled && $user->mfa_confirmed_at) {
$fingerprint = $request->header('X-Device-Fingerprint');
if ($fingerprint && $this->mfaService->isDeviceTrusted($user, $fingerprint)) {
return $this->issueToken($user, $request);
}
// Revoke ALL existing tokens so old sessions cannot bypass MFA.
// The only way to get a new token is through MfaVerifyController
// after a successful code verification.
$user->tokens()->delete();
$mfaSession = $this->mfaService->createMfaSession($user, $request->ip());
// Auto-send email code if email is the preferred method
if ($user->mfa_method === MfaMethod::EMAIL->value) {
try {
$this->mfaService->sendEmailCode($user);
} catch (\DomainException) {
// Rate limited — code was already sent recently
}
}
// Return MFA challenge — NO auth token, NO auth cookie.
// Expire the auth cookie to invalidate any stale browser session.
return response()->json([
'success' => true,
'mfa_required' => true,
...$mfaSession,
])->withCookie($this->forgetAuthCookie());
}
// MFA required by policy but not yet set up — issue token with flag
if ($this->mfaService->isMfaRequired($user) && ! $user->mfa_enabled) {
$response = $this->issueToken($user, $request);
$data = $response->getData(true);
$data['mfa_setup_required'] = true;
$token = $user->createToken('auth-token')->plainTextToken;
return response()->json($data)
->withCookie($this->makeAuthCookie($token));
}
// No MFA — issue token as normal
return $this->issueToken($user, $request);
}
private function issueToken(User $user, LoginRequest $request): JsonResponse
{
$user->load([
'organisations',
'roles',
'permissions',
'persons' => fn ($q) => $q->with(['event:id,name,slug,start_date,end_date,organisation_id', 'event.organisation:id,name']),
]);
$token = $user->createToken('auth-token')->plainTextToken;
return $this->success([
'user' => new MeResource($user),
], 'Login successful')
->withCookie($this->makeAuthCookie($token));
}
}