The dual-cookie machinery (crewli_app_token + crewli_portal_token,
Origin-based resolution) was load-bearing only when the second SPA
existed. apps/portal/ was deleted in WS-3 PR-B1; the resolver code
has been carrying dead branches since then. Collapse to one cookie.
Cookie name retained as crewli_app_token — no session breakage on
deploy. crewli_portal_token is fully purged from the server-side.
CookieBearerToken middleware:
- COOKIE_NAMES array → single COOKIE_NAME constant
- resolveCookieName method (Origin/Referer parsing, host+port
matching against frontend_app_url/frontend_portal_url) → removed
- Body collapses to: skip if Authorization header present; else
read crewli_app_token cookie and inject Bearer header
SetAuthCookie trait:
- COOKIE_MAP / resolveCookieName / originMatches → removed
- makeAuthCookie / forgetAuthCookie now take only $token; the
cookie name is the trait's private constant
Five callers updated to drop the resolveCookieName($request) line
and the cookie-name argument: LoginController (3 sites),
MfaVerifyController (1 site), AuthRefreshController (1 site),
LogoutController (1 site), InvitationController (1 site — caller
list in the prompt missed this one but the same pattern applies).
frontend_portal_url config key retained (per Phase A directive Q1):
EmailChangeController, PasswordResetController, PersonController are
non-auth consumers that build per-app URL maps for outbound emails.
The map structure is now functionally redundant (production resolves
all FRONTEND_* env vars to the same host) but stays structurally
intact. Refactor tracked as TECH-FRONTEND-URL-CONSOLIDATE in the
upcoming docs commit.
HttpOnlyCookieAuthTest:
- Removed 4 dual-cookie tests (login_sets_portal_cookie_for_portal_origin,
app_cookie_does_not_authenticate_portal_requests,
portal_cookie_does_not_authenticate_app_requests,
correct_cookie_authenticates_with_matching_origin)
- Renamed login_sets_app_cookie_for_unknown_origin →
login_sets_app_cookie_regardless_of_origin; expanded to four
Origin variants (none, app, unknown, foreign) — pins the new
origin-agnostic contract
- Removed Origin headers from request calls in remaining tests
(now meaningless)
Backend test count: 1491 → 1487 (-4 deleted, dual-cookie tests
encoding the obsolete contract). Pint clean. Larastan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SECURITY: A user with MFA enabled could bypass the MFA challenge by
using a pre-existing auth cookie from a previous session.
Vulnerability chain:
1. Auth::attempt() in LoginController created a Laravel session
(unnecessary side effect — only credential validation was needed)
2. When MFA was required, the response did NOT revoke existing
Sanctum tokens or expire the auth cookie
3. If the MFA session expired, the user could navigate directly to
any page and the old auth cookie would authenticate them
Fixes:
- Replace Auth::attempt() with Hash::check() — no session created
- Revoke ALL existing Sanctum tokens when MFA is required, so old
sessions cannot bypass the challenge
- Expire the auth cookie in the MFA-required response via
forgetAuthCookie(), ensuring the browser discards stale tokens
- Auth is now ONLY issued after successful MFA verification in
MfaVerifyController
New security tests (11 added):
- MFA login returns no auth token or user data
- MFA login expires the auth cookie
- MFA login revokes all existing tokens
- Old token returns 401 after MFA login
- MFA session token cannot be used as Bearer token
- MFA session consumed after successful verify (no replay)
- MFA session survives failed verify (user can retry)
- Auth cookie only issued on successful MFA verify
- MFA session expires after TTL (10 minutes)
- Email codes consumed after use (no replay)
- Trusted device expires after 30 days
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three verification methods (TOTP authenticator, email code, backup codes),
trusted device management with 30-day expiry, role-based enforcement for
super_admin and org_admin, admin reset capability, and full test coverage
(46 tests). Modifies login flow to support MFA challenge/response with
temporary session tokens stored in cache.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
LoginController used UserResource (returns `roles`) but the frontend
authStore.setUser() expects MeResponse format with `app_roles`. After
login, appRoles was set to undefined, making isSuperAdmin always false.
Combined with isInitialized staying true after the initial failed
/auth/me call, the correct /auth/me was never re-fetched after login.
Fix: use MeResource in LoginController (same as MeController) so the
login response includes app_roles, permissions, and portal_events.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- CookieBearerToken middleware reads httpOnly cookie and injects Authorization
header before Sanctum validates (prepended to API middleware group)
- SetAuthCookie trait provides cookie creation/expiry helpers with per-app
cookie names (crewli_admin_token, crewli_app_token, crewli_portal_token)
- LoginController sets token via Set-Cookie, removes it from JSON body
- LogoutController expires the auth cookie on logout
- AuthRefreshController (POST /auth/refresh) rotates tokens with new cookie
- InvitationController accept also sets token via cookie, not JSON body
- All cookies: httpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure (in production)
Frontend (all three SPAs):
- Removed all localStorage token storage (apps/app, apps/portal)
- Removed all JS-readable cookie token storage (apps/admin)
- Removed Authorization: Bearer header interceptors from axios
- Auth stores now rely on GET /auth/me to validate httpOnly cookie
- Admin app: new Pinia auth store replaces useCookie-based auth pattern
- withCredentials: true ensures browser sends cookies automatically
Fixes security findings A13-1 (localStorage tokens) and A13-2 (admin
cookie flags). Tokens are now invisible to JavaScript.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add throttle middleware to login (5/min), portal/token-auth (10/min),
volunteer-register (5/min), and invitation routes (10/min)
- Set Sanctum token expiration to 7 days
- Remove billing_status from UpdateOrganisationRequest (super_admin only)
- Revoke all Sanctum tokens on password reset
- Strengthen password rules: min 8 chars, mixed case, numbers
- Create SecurityHeaders middleware (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options,
HSTS, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)
- Fix open redirect on all 3 login pages (validate ?to= starts with /)
- Set APP_DEBUG=false in .env.example
- Log failed login attempts with email, IP, user-agent
- Log authorization failures (403) with user, IP, path, method
- Harden mass assignment: remove user_id from Person, audit fields from
ShiftAssignment, system fields from UserInvitation $fillable
- Replace real DB records with factory make() in mail preview routes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
