RFC §4 V3 compliance — cross-tenant access to FormSubmissionActionFailure
endpoints returns 404, not 403, to prevent resource-existence
enumeration. The FormSubmissionActionFailurePolicy is the single tenant
gate; these tests assert the route-level integration end-to-end.
Production-code finding (in scope per "security gaps zijn altijd urgent"):
the orgIndex endpoint had a real IDOR gap. Original implementation called
`Gate::authorize('viewAny', ...)` which permits any org_admin in any org,
then filtered the result set by the URL's `{organisation}` param. orgB's
admin hitting `/organisations/{orgA}/form-failures` would get back orgA's
failures — leakage.
Fix:
- New policy method `viewAnyInOrganisation(User, Organisation)` that
requires super_admin OR org_admin on THIS specific organisation.
- Controller `orgIndex` calls `authorizeViewAnyInOrgOrNotFound()` which
translates a denied policy → 404 (matches the show/retry/resolve/dismiss
pattern).
- viewAny on the class level stays as the platformIndex gate (super_admin
+ any-org_admin enumeration is acceptable on the platform endpoint
because the role middleware already restricts to super_admin).
Test coverage (24 tests, all passing):
- 5 org-scoped endpoints × cross-tenant scenarios (all return 404)
- 5 platform endpoints × role-class scenarios (org_admin gets 403, never 404)
- Edge cases: soft-deleted parent submission, invalid ULID format,
non-existent ID, unauthenticated, authenticated-without-role on org
The 403 vs 404 distinction matters: role-gated endpoints return 403
(auth-class — "not allowed in this room"); ownership-gated endpoints
return 404 (IDOR-class — "this room doesn't exist for you").
Refs: RFC-WS-6.md §4 V3, ARCH-BINDINGS.md §8.2 (Task 3 of this session)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bert.hausmans
6b22c8d763