crewli/dev-docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md

Crewli Security Audit — 2026-04-14

Summary

• Total findings: 57
• Critical: 10 | High: 19 | Medium: 18 | Low: 10

Audit scope: all files under api/ and apps/ (app, portal).

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Findings

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A01 — Broken Access Control

[CRITICAL] A01-1: PortalTokenMiddleware is a complete no-op

• File: api/app/Http/Middleware/PortalTokenMiddleware.php:17-19
• Description: The portal.token middleware calls $next($request) unconditionally — it performs zero token validation.
• Risk: Any route protected by portal.token is completely unprotected. Future routes added under this middleware will silently allow unauthenticated access.
• Fix: Implement the middleware to extract and validate a portal token from the request, establish the portal context (actor identity + permitted event), and return 401 if invalid.

[CRITICAL] A01-2: PortalShiftController::claim() does not verify the shift belongs to the event

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/Portal/PortalShiftController.php:173-202
• Description: Route POST /portal/events/{event}/shifts/{shift}/claim resolves $person by user_id + event_id but does NOT verify that $shift belongs to $event. A volunteer can supply any shift ID from a different event or organisation.
• Risk: Cross-tenant shift claiming — volunteers can claim shifts in events/organisations they have no association with.
• Fix: Verify $shift->festivalSection->event_id is within the resolved event IDs before proceeding.

[CRITICAL] A01-3: ShiftAssignmentPolicy does not verify the assignment belongs to the event

• File: api/app/Policies/ShiftAssignmentPolicy.php:19-43
• Description: The approve, reject, and cancel policy methods check whether the user can manage $event, but never verify $assignment belongs to that event. A malicious org_admin for event A can approve/reject/cancel assignments from event B.
• Risk: Cross-event data manipulation across organisations.
• Fix: Add if ($assignment->shift->festivalSection->event_id !== $event->id) return false; in each method.

[HIGH] A01-4: OrganisationScope is defined but never registered on any model

• File: api/app/Models/Scopes/OrganisationScope.php
• Description: The scope class exists but no model registers it via booted() / addGlobalScope(). The CLAUDE.md mandates using it on all event-related models.
• Risk: No automatic multi-tenancy safety net. Isolation relies entirely on controller-level routing, which is fragile.
• Fix: Register the scope on Event, Person, Shift, FestivalSection, TimeSlot, Location, CrowdList, CrowdType, Company, PersonTag, RegistrationFormField, RegistrationFieldTemplate.

[HIGH] A01-5: ShiftController::assign() and claim() use unscoped Person::findOrFail()

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/ShiftController.php:74,84
• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/AssignShiftRequest.php:20
• Description: Person::findOrFail($request->validated('person_id')) fetches any person by ID regardless of event or organisation. The exists:persons,id rule has no scoping.
• Risk: Cross-organisation person assignment — an org admin can assign shifts to persons from another tenant.
• Fix: Scope to event: Person::where('id', $personId)->where('event_id', $event->id)->firstOrFail().

[HIGH] A01-6: CrowdListController::addPerson() uses unscoped Person::findOrFail()

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/CrowdListController.php:81
• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/AddPersonToCrowdListRequest.php:20
• Description: Same issue as A01-5. A person from another organisation can be added to a crowd list.
• Risk: Cross-tenant data leakage and reference pollution.
• Fix: Scope the exists rule: Rule::exists('persons', 'id')->where('event_id', $request->route('event')->id).

[HIGH] A01-7: BulkApproveShiftAssignmentRequest uses unscoped exists:shift_assignments,id

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/BulkApproveShiftAssignmentRequest.php:21
• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/ShiftAssignmentController.php:98-103
• Description: assignment_ids.* validated with exists:shift_assignments,id without event or organisation scope. The controller loads assignments without filtering.
• Risk: Cross-tenant bulk approval of shift assignments.
• Fix: Add .whereHas('shift.festivalSection', fn ($q) => $q->where('event_id', $event->id)) to the query.

[HIGH] A01-8: BulkConfirmIdentityMatchesRequest uses unscoped exists:person_identity_matches,id

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/BulkConfirmIdentityMatchesRequest.php:21
• Description: Match IDs are not scoped to the route's organisation. An org admin could include IDs from another organisation.
• Risk: Cross-tenant identity match manipulation.
• Fix: Scope the query to organisation events in the controller.

[HIGH] A01-9: ReorderRegistrationFormFieldsRequest uses unscoped exists:registration_form_fields,id

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/ReorderRegistrationFormFieldsRequest.php:21
• Description: Field IDs are not scoped to the event. Fields from other events could be reordered.
• Risk: Cross-event field manipulation.
• Fix: Add Rule::exists('registration_form_fields', 'id')->where('event_id', $this->route('event')->id).

[HIGH] A01-10: PortalMeController::index() accepts any event_id without access verification

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PortalMeController.php:23-83
• Description: Takes event_id as a query parameter and calls Event::findOrFail() which returns any event from any organisation.
• Risk: A user registered for events at multiple organisations can access their profile data cross-org by probing event IDs.
• Fix: Validate that the authenticated user has a Person record for the requested event.

[HIGH] A01-11: InvitationController::revoke() does not verify the invitation belongs to the organisation

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/InvitationController.php:76
• Description: Route DELETE organisations/{organisation}/invitations/{invitation} resolves the invitation globally. Never checks $invitation->organisation_id === $organisation->id.
• Risk: An org admin of Org A can revoke invitations belonging to Org B.
• Fix: Add if ($invitation->organisation_id !== $organisation->id) abort(404);.

[HIGH] A01-12: PersonIdentityMatchController does not verify matches belong to the route organisation

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PersonIdentityMatchController.php:51,66,85
• Description: confirm, dismiss, and bulkConfirm resolve matches globally. The route's {organisation} parameter is unused in policy checks.
• Risk: Cross-org identity match confirmation/dismissal.
• Fix: Scope match resolution: ->whereHas('person', fn ($q) => $q->whereIn('event_id', $organisation->events()->select('id'))).

[HIGH] A01-13: Event routes without organisation prefix bypass scope

• File: api/routes/api.php:152-207
• Description: Routes like events/{event}/stats, events/{event}/locations, etc. are not nested under organisations/{organisation}. The Event model has no OrganisationScope. Route model binding finds events globally.
• Risk: Authenticated users can access event data from other organisations. The stats endpoint specifically calls Gate::authorize('view', $event) with no organisation parameter, skipping the org ownership check in the policy.
• Fix: Move routes under organisations/{organisation}/events/{event}/... or register OrganisationScope on the Event model.

[MEDIUM] A01-14: Multiple form requests use unscoped exists:crowd_types,id and exists:companies,id

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/StorePersonRequest.php:20,26
• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/UpdatePersonRequest.php:20,26
• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/StoreCrowdListRequest.php:22,25
• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/UpdateCrowdListRequest.php:22,25
• Description: These allow crowd_type_id and company_id values from any organisation.
• Risk: Cross-tenant reference pollution.
• Fix: Use Rule::exists()->where('organisation_id', ...).

[MEDIUM] A01-15: UpdateEventRequest uses unscoped exists:events,id for parent_event_id

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/UpdateEventRequest.php:26
• Description: parent_event_id validated with exists:events,id without organisation scoping. The update controller does not re-verify.
• Risk: An event can be re-parented to an event from a different organisation.
• Fix: Scope: Rule::exists('events', 'id')->where('organisation_id', $this->route('organisation')->id).

[MEDIUM] A01-16: PortalShiftController::cancel() does not verify shiftAssignment belongs to the event

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/Portal/PortalShiftController.php:204-237
• Description: Checks person_id ownership but not that the assignment belongs to the URL's event context.
• Risk: Cross-event assignment cancellation for users registered in multiple events.
• Fix: Verify $shiftAssignment->shift->timeSlot->event_id is in the resolved event IDs.

[MEDIUM] A01-17: MemberController::update() and destroy() don't verify the user is a member

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/MemberController.php:27-82
• Description: Neither verifies the target $user is actually a member of the organisation. The "last org_admin" safeguard can be bypassed.
• Risk: Misleading success responses; bypasses admin count safeguard.
• Fix: Add if (!$organisation->users()->where('user_id', $user->id)->exists()) abort(404);.

[MEDIUM] A01-18: RegistrationFormFieldController::importFromEvent() fragile org check

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/RegistrationFormFieldController.php:98-107
• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/ImportFromEventRequest.php:20-40
• Description: The exists:events,id rule accepts any event. Cross-org check is in withValidator callback, not in the rule itself.
• Risk: Fragile defence — removing the withValidator callback silently enables cross-org import.
• Fix: Use Rule::exists('events', 'id')->where('organisation_id', ...) directly in the rules array.

[LOW] A01-19: OrganisationPolicy::viewAny() returns true unconditionally

• File: api/app/Policies/OrganisationPolicy.php:13-16
• Description: Returns true for all authenticated users. Controller correctly scopes results, but the policy provides no guard.
• Risk: No current exposure; maintenance risk if controller query changes.
• Fix: Document the design decision; optionally remove the policy gate call.

[LOW] A01-20: ShiftAssignmentController::assignablePersons() uses raw DB::table() query

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/ShiftAssignmentController.php:156-170
• Description: Raw query correctly scoped but bypasses Eloquent models and future global scopes.
• Risk: Maintenance risk.
• Fix: Replace with Eloquent query.

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A02 — Cryptographic Failures

[CRITICAL] A02-1: Portal and invitation tokens use ULID (predictable time-prefix)

• File: api/database/migrations/2026_04_08_170000_create_artists_table.php:31
• File: api/app/Services/InvitationService.php:45
• Description: Portal tokens are char(26) (ULID size). ULID has 48 predictable timestamp bits + only 80 random bits. Invitation tokens also use Str::ulid().
• Risk: An attacker who knows the approximate creation time can reduce the search space significantly. Combined with no rate limiting (A07-5), token brute-force becomes practical.
• Fix: Use bin2hex(random_bytes(32)) for all security tokens — provides 256 bits of cryptographic randomness.

[HIGH] A02-2: Sanctum tokens never expire

• File: api/config/sanctum.php:52
• Description: 'expiration' => null — all issued tokens are permanent.
• Risk: A stolen token grants indefinite access with no automatic remediation.
• Fix: Set 'expiration' => 60 * 24 * 7 (7 days). Implement token refresh for long-lived sessions.

[HIGH] A02-3: Portal tokens stored plaintext with no expiry or revocation

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PortalTokenController.php
• File: api/database/migrations/2026_04_08_170000_create_artists_table.php:31
• Description: Portal tokens are compared with where('portal_token', $token) — plaintext storage. No expires_at column, no revocation mechanism.
• Risk: A database dump exposes all active tokens. A compromised token is valid indefinitely.
• Fix: Store hash('sha256', $token), add portal_token_expires_at column, expire tokens after the event ends.

[MEDIUM] A02-4: Session secure cookie not enforced

• File: api/config/session.php:172
• Description: 'secure' => env('SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE') resolves to null/false when env var is absent. Session cookie sent over plain HTTP.
• Risk: Session hijacking via HTTP interception.
• Fix: Add SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE=true to .env.example. Default: env('SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE', app()->isProduction()).

[LOW] A02-5: Session encryption disabled by default

• File: api/.env:28
• Description: SESSION_ENCRYPT=false — session data in database is unencrypted.
• Risk: Database access exposes session contents.
• Fix: Set SESSION_ENCRYPT=true in production.

[LOW] A02-6: No HTTPS enforcement middleware

• File: api/config/app.php:55
• Description: APP_URL defaults to http:// and no ForceHttps middleware exists.
• Risk: API accessible over HTTP in misconfigured deployments.
• Fix: Add HTTPS enforcement middleware for production, or use URL::forceScheme('https') in AppServiceProvider.

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A03 — Injection

[MEDIUM] A03-1: EventController::index() uses unvalidated query parameters in where() clauses

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/EventController.php:31-33
• Description: Unvalidated query param type used in where() — no Form Request for index action. While Eloquent uses PDO bindings (no SQL injection), this is an input validation gap.
• Risk: Unexpected behaviour with malformed input.
• Fix: Add a Form Request or validate type as in:event,festival,series.

[LOW] A03-2: PersonController::reject() — unvalidated reason passed to mail

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PersonController.php:130
• Description: $request->input('reason') used without length validation. The Blade template escapes it ({{ }}), so no XSS, but no length cap exists.
• Risk: Oversized email payload.
• Fix: Add a Form Request with 'reason' => ['nullable', 'string', 'max:1000'].

Positive findings (A03)

• All whereRaw() / selectRaw() calls use parameterised bindings — no SQL injection vectors found.
• No exec(), shell_exec(), system(), proc_open(), passthru(), or backtick operators found.
• No {!! !!} (unescaped Blade output) found — all output uses {{ }}.
• No LDAP or XPath injection vectors found.

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A04 — Insecure Design

[CRITICAL] A04-1: billing_status writable by org_admin via API

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/UpdateOrganisationRequest.php:26
• File: api/app/Models/Organisation.php:23
• Description: billing_status is in Organisation::$fillable AND in UpdateOrganisationRequest rules. Any org_admin can self-upgrade from suspended/trial to active.
• Risk: Billing bypass — organisations can override their subscription status.
• Fix: Remove billing_status from UpdateOrganisationRequest::rules(). Create a separate super_admin-only endpoint.

[CRITICAL] A04-2: No rate limiting on auth/login endpoint

• File: api/routes/api.php:58
• Description: Route::post('auth/login', LoginController::class) has no throttle middleware. Unlimited credential-guessing is possible.
• Risk: Full credential-stuffing and password-spray attacks.
• Fix: ->middleware('throttle:5,1'). For tighter control, configure a named limiter keyed on email|ip.

[CRITICAL] A04-3: No rate limiting on portal/token-auth endpoint

• File: api/routes/api.php:73
• Description: No throttle middleware on POST portal/token-auth. Combined with ULID predictability (A02-1), token enumeration becomes practical.
• Risk: Automated token brute-force/enumeration.
• Fix: ->middleware('throttle:10,1').

[CRITICAL] A04-4: portal/token-auth returns raw model data including all columns

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PortalTokenController.php:29-33,42-47
• Description: Returns (array) $artist and $event?->toArray() — every database column exposed including internal fields, milestone booleans, project_leader_id, etc.
• Risk: Internal operational data exposed to portal users. Violates "Return all responses through API resources."
• Fix: Create ArtistPortalResource and PortalEventResource to whitelist only necessary fields.

[HIGH] A04-5: Person::$fillable includes user_id and status

• File: api/app/Models/Person.php:27,36
• Description: user_id (identity link) and status (approval state) are in $fillable. Controller layer is safe today, but model-level permission enables future mass-assignment.
• Risk: Latent mass-assignment risk for identity hijacking.
• Fix: Remove user_id from $fillable. Set explicitly: $person->user_id = $user->id.

[HIGH] A04-6: ShiftAssignment::$fillable includes audit trail fields

• File: api/app/Models/ShiftAssignment.php:23-40
• Description: auto_approved, assigned_by, approved_by, approved_at, cancelled_by, cancelled_at, checked_in_at, checked_out_at are fillable.
• Risk: Future fill($request->all()) call could forge audit trails.
• Fix: Remove all audit-trail fields from $fillable. Set explicitly in the service layer.

[HIGH] A04-7: UserInvitation::$fillable includes role, token, status

• File: api/app/Models/UserInvitation.php:18-27
• Description: role, token, status, organisation_id, invited_by_user_id, expires_at are all fillable — entirely system-set fields.
• Risk: Latent mass-assignment vector.
• Fix: Remove from $fillable, set explicitly in InvitationService.

[MEDIUM] A04-8: No self-approval guard in ShiftAssignmentPolicy

• File: api/app/Policies/ShiftAssignmentPolicy.php:19-23
• Description: An org_admin who is also a registered volunteer can approve their own shift assignment.
• Risk: Self-approval of shift assignments bypasses the approval workflow.
• Fix: Add if ($assignment->person?->user_id === $user->id) return false; in approve().

[MEDIUM] A04-9: No rate limiting on volunteer registration endpoint

• File: api/routes/api.php:72
• Description: events/{event}/volunteer-register has no throttle middleware.
• Risk: Automated mass registration / spam.
• Fix: ->middleware('throttle:5,1').

[LOW] A04-10: No rate limiting on invitation accept endpoint

• File: api/routes/api.php:62
• Description: invitations/{token}/accept has no throttle middleware.
• Risk: Token brute-force (mitigated by ULID entropy).
• Fix: ->middleware('throttle:10,1').

[LOW] A04-11: Inline validate() in PasswordResetController

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PasswordResetController.php:28-32
• Description: Both methods use $request->validate() inline instead of Form Requests. Violates project rules.
• Risk: Inconsistent validation patterns.
• Fix: Extract to dedicated Form Requests.

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A05 — Security Misconfiguration

[HIGH] A05-1: No security headers middleware

• Description: No X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Strict-Transport-Security, or Content-Security-Policy headers are added anywhere in the middleware stack.
• Risk: Clickjacking, MIME sniffing attacks, missing HSTS.
• Fix: Create and register a SecurityHeaders middleware with: X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains, X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block.

[MEDIUM] A05-2: APP_DEBUG=true in .env.example

• File: api/.env.example:4
• Description: .env.example defaults APP_DEBUG=true, training developers to leave it enabled. The exception handler (correctly) gates debug output on config('app.debug').
• Risk: Accidental production deployment with debug enabled exposes stack traces and query details.
• Fix: Change .env.example to APP_DEBUG=false with comment # Set to true only in local development.

[MEDIUM] A05-3: Session SameSite=Lax may break cross-subdomain Sanctum cookie auth

• File: api/config/session.php:202
• Description: With two SPAs on different subdomains calling api.crewli.app, SameSite=Lax blocks session cookies on cross-origin requests.
• Risk: Sanctum SPA authentication may fail silently in production.
• Fix: Set SESSION_DOMAIN=.crewli.app and SESSION_SAME_SITE=none (with SESSION_SECURE_COOKIE=true) in production.

[MEDIUM] A05-4: /mail-preview/{type} web route exposes real database records without auth

• File: api/routes/web.php:12-52
• Description: Mail preview gated by app()->environment('local', 'staging') but fetches real Person, Event, UserInvitation records with no authentication.
• Risk: Staging environment exposes real data including invitation tokens.
• Fix: Add ->middleware('auth:sanctum') or generate previews using factory-only data.

[MEDIUM] A05-5: Local .env uses wrong mail sender domain

• File: api/.env:50
• Description: MAIL_FROM_ADDRESS="noreply@eventcrew.nl" — should be noreply@crewli.app per CLAUDE.md.
• Risk: Failed SPF/DKIM, confused recipients.
• Fix: Update to noreply@crewli.app.

[LOW] A05-6: allowed_headers: ['*'] in CORS config

• File: api/config/cors.php:22
• Description: Accepts any header from allowed origins. Only Content-Type, Authorization, X-Requested-With, Accept are needed.
• Risk: Overly broad attack surface.
• Fix: Constrain to needed headers.

Positive findings (A05)

• CORS allowed_origins correctly restricted to two specific SPAs (not *).
• supports_credentials: true correctly set for Sanctum.
• APP_DEBUG defaults to false in config/app.php.
• No Telescope/Horizon routes found (not installed).
• No phpinfo endpoints exposed.
• Password hashing uses bcrypt with BCRYPT_ROUNDS=12.
• $password is in $hidden on User model.

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A06 — Vulnerable Components

[CRITICAL] A06-1: @casl/ability 6.7.3 — Prototype Pollution

• File: apps/app/package.json, apps/portal/package.json
• Description: CASL is used for frontend permission enforcement across both apps. Prototype pollution could corrupt ability checks.
• Risk: Permission bypass in the frontend. Admin tokens at elevated risk.
• Fix: Upgrade to >=6.7.5 in both apps.

[CRITICAL] A06-2: axios ~1.13.x — SSRF and metadata exfiltration

• File: apps/app/package.json, apps/portal/package.json
• Description: Two critical CVEs: NO_PROXY hostname normalization bypass (SSRF) and unrestricted cloud metadata exfiltration via header injection.
• Risk: Cloud metadata theft, SSRF in SSR contexts.
• Fix: Upgrade to >=1.15.0 in both apps.

[CRITICAL] A06-3: swiper 11.2.10 — Prototype Pollution

• File: apps/app/package.json, apps/portal/package.json
• Description: Prototype pollution vulnerability.
• Risk: Client-side code execution.
• Fix: Upgrade to >=12.1.2 (major version bump — review migration guide).

[MEDIUM] A06-4: league/commonmark 2.8.0 — HTML injection bypass

• File: api/composer.json
• Description: Two CVEs: allowed_domains bypass in embed extension (CVE-2026-33347) and DisallowedRawHtml bypass via whitespace (CVE-2026-30838).
• Risk: If user-supplied Markdown is rendered, raw HTML injection is possible.
• Fix: composer update league/commonmark to >=2.8.2.

[LOW] A06-5: phpunit/phpunit 11.5.46 — Unsafe deserialization (dev only)

• File: api/composer.json
• Description: CVE-2026-24765 — dev dependency only, not deployed.
• Risk: CI/CD pipeline risk only.
• Fix: composer update phpunit/phpunit to >=11.5.50.

[LOW] A06-6: psy/psysh 0.12.18 — Local privilege escalation

• File: api/composer.json (via laravel/tinker)
• Description: CVE-2026-25129 — local privilege escalation via CWD .psysh.php auto-load.
• Risk: Low — requires shell access. Confirm Tinker is not exposed via web route.
• Fix: composer update laravel/tinker.

[LOW] A06-7: Frontend dev dependencies — 45 vulnerabilities in build tools

• File: apps/app/pnpm-lock.yaml, apps/portal/pnpm-lock.yaml
• Description: vite, rollup, tar, undici, minimatch, svgo, flatted, immutable, lodash, picomatch — various high/moderate vulnerabilities in dev/build-time dependencies.
• Risk: Not shipped to production. CI/CD pipeline risk.
• Fix: Update dev dependencies: pnpm update for each app.

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A07 — Identification and Authentication Failures

[MEDIUM] A07-1: Account enumeration via CheckEmailController

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/CheckEmailController.php:16-18
• Description: Returns {"exists": true/false} for any email. Rate limited to 10/min but still enables targeted enumeration.
• Risk: Confirms which email addresses are registered users.
• Fix: Consider removing this endpoint or requiring CAPTCHA. If needed for UX, apply stricter rate limiting.

[MEDIUM] A07-2: Existing Sanctum tokens not revoked on password reset

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PasswordResetController.php:35-43
• Description: Password::reset() updates the password but does not revoke existing tokens. An attacker with a stolen token retains access after reset.
• Risk: Password reset does not evict active attackers.
• Fix: Add $user->tokens()->delete(); in the closure after saving the new password.

[MEDIUM] A07-3: Weak password validation (min:8 only, no complexity)

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/LoginRequest.php:22
• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/AcceptInvitationRequest.php:27
• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PasswordResetController.php:32
• Description: All password fields only enforce min:8. No mixed case, digits, symbols, or breach-check.
• Risk: Common/weak passwords accepted.
• Fix: Use Password::min(8)->mixedCase()->numbers() consistently. Consider ->uncompromised().

[MEDIUM] A07-4: No rate limiting on invitation routes

• File: api/routes/api.php:61-62
• Description: GET/POST invitations/{token} and invitations/{token}/accept have no throttle.
• Risk: Token brute-force and enumeration. show endpoint confirms token validity (404 vs. 200).
• Fix: ->middleware('throttle:10,1') on both routes.

[LOW] A07-5: Schema::hasTable() runtime checks in PortalTokenController

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/PortalTokenController.php:22,37
• Description: Schema introspection on every request. The 501 response reveals database schema info.
• Risk: Minor info disclosure + performance cost.
• Fix: Remove Schema::hasTable() guards; handle via migration, not runtime.

[LOW] A07-6: Email in password reset URL query string

• File: api/app/Providers/AppServiceProvider.php:19-21
• Description: Email address included as plaintext query parameter in the reset URL. Appears in browser history, server logs, referrer headers.
• Risk: Email address leakage.
• Fix: Omit email from URL; require user to enter it on the reset form.

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A08 — Software and Data Integrity

Positive findings (A08)

• CSRF intentionally disabled for stateless token-based API — appropriate architecture.
• File uploads validate image, mimes:jpg,jpeg,png,webp, max:5120. Uses server-generated filenames.
• All dependency lock files committed (composer.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml x3).
• Sanctum token prefix is empty ('') — consider setting SANCTUM_TOKEN_PREFIX=crewli_ to enable GitHub secret scanning.

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A09 — Security Logging and Monitoring

[HIGH] A09-1: Failed login attempts not logged

• File: api/app/Http/Controllers/Api/V1/LoginController.php:17
• Description: On failed Auth::attempt(), returns 401 with no log entry, no event firing.
• Risk: Brute-force attacks leave no audit trail.
• Fix: Add Log::warning('Failed login attempt', ['email' => ..., 'ip' => ..., 'user_agent' => ...]).

[MEDIUM] A09-2: Authorization failures (403) not logged

• File: api/bootstrap/app.php:65-90
• Description: AuthorizationException is handled but not logged. Cross-tenant access probes leave no trace.
• Risk: No visibility into privilege escalation attempts.
• Fix: Add a Log::warning() in the exception handler for AuthorizationException with user, IP, path, method context.

[MEDIUM] A09-3: Missing activity log on 10+ critical actions

• Description: spatie/laravel-activitylog is installed but many critical actions are not logged:
  • Login success/failure
  • Logout
  • Person approved/rejected
  • Shift assignment approved/rejected/cancelled
  • Portal profile updated / password changed
  • Password reset completed
  • Organisation settings changed
  • Event status transitions
  • Identity match confirmed/dismissed
• Risk: No audit trail for administrative decisions.
• Fix: Add activity() or Log::info() calls for these actions.

[MEDIUM] A09-4: No suspicious pattern detection

• Description: No mechanism to detect rapid failed logins, cross-tenant access attempts, or token enumeration.
• Risk: Attacks proceed indefinitely without alerts.
• Fix: Configure RateLimiter in AppServiceProvider::boot() with Lockout notifications after N failures.

[LOW] A09-5: VolunteerRegistrationService catch block swallows exception context

• File: api/app/Services/VolunteerRegistrationService.php:143-154
• Description: UniqueConstraintViolationException is caught and re-thrown as ValidationException without logging the original.
• Risk: Race condition failures are invisible.
• Fix: Log the original exception before rethrowing.

---

A10 — Server-Side Request Forgery

[LOW] A10-1: email_logo_url accepts any HTTP URL rendered in email templates

• File: api/app/Http/Requests/Api/V1/UpdateOrganisationRequest.php:28
• File: api/resources/views/mail/layouts/crewli.blade.php:22
• Description: User-supplied URL used as <img src> in outbound emails. Email clients request this URL, leaking recipient IP and metadata.
• Risk: Tracking pixel injection, recipient metadata exfiltration.
• Fix: Restrict to HTTPS only (regex:/^https:\/\//). Consider server-side image proxy.

Positive findings (A10)

• No Http::get/post, file_get_contents(), or curl_* calls in application code.
• No webhook or callback URL configurations found.
• No ZenderService or external HTTP client services exist.

---

Frontend Security (A13)

[CRITICAL] A13-1: Bearer tokens stored in localStorage (apps/app and apps/portal) RESOLVED

• File: apps/app/src/stores/useAuthStore.ts (single SPA post WS-3)
• Description: Pre-WS-3 (April 2026) the SPA layer used per-app cookies (crewli_app_token, crewli_portal_token) with Origin-based middleware resolution. WS-3 PR-B consolidated the dual SPAs into a single apps/app workspace; PR-B2b retired the dual-cookie machinery. The system now issues a single httpOnly crewli_app_token cookie. The localStorage-based bearer-token storage that this finding originally flagged was migrated to httpOnly cookies as part of the same consolidation arc.
• Resolution: Tokens are httpOnly + Secure + SameSite=Strict, set server-side, never exposed to JavaScript. See dev-docs/AUTH_ARCHITECTURE.md for current architecture.

[HIGH] A13-2: Admin app cookies lack httpOnly, Secure, and SameSite flags RETIRED

• File: apps/admin/ (removed)
• Description: The admin SPA has been retired. Its functionality now lives in apps/app/ under /platform/* routes.
• Resolution: Finding no longer applicable — apps/admin/ has been removed.

[HIGH] A13-3: Open redirect vulnerability on post-login redirect (all apps) RESOLVED by WS-3 PR-B2b

• File: apps/app/src/utils/postLoginRedirect.ts (single SPA post WS-3)
• Description: Login pages accepted ?to= query parameter and redirected to it after login without validating it's a relative path.
• Risk: Phishing: https://crewli.app/login?to=https://evil.com/steal.
• Resolution: WS-3 PR-B2a introduced a minimum precaution (startsWith('/') && !startsWith('//')); WS-3 PR-B2b replaced it with full validation. The isSafeRelativePath helper in apps/app/src/utils/postLoginRedirect.ts now rejects empty input, non-/-prefixed paths, protocol-relative URLs, backslashes (browsers normalise \ → /), ASCII control characters (\x00–\x1F, \x7F), and anything the URL constructor parses to a different origin than a synthetic invalid base. 16 vitest specs pin the contract.

[HIGH] A13-4: v-html with API-sourced data in admin app (template pages) RETIRED

• File: apps/admin/ (removed)
• Description: The admin SPA has been retired. Its functionality now lives in apps/app/ under /platform/* routes.
• Resolution: Finding no longer applicable — apps/admin/ has been removed.

[HIGH] A13-5: Admin router guard relies on JS-readable cookie without server validation RETIRED

• File: apps/admin/ (removed)
• Description: The admin SPA has been retired. Its functionality now lives in apps/app/ under /platform/* routes.
• Resolution: Finding no longer applicable — apps/admin/ has been removed.

[MEDIUM] A13-6: Server error messages forwarded to UI

• File: apps/app/src/pages/login.vue:59-69
• File: apps/portal/src/pages/login.vue:51
• Description: Raw data.message from API errors rendered in UI. Could expose internal details if backend misconfigured.
• Risk: Information disclosure (table names, file paths).
• Fix: Use safelist-based error mapping. The portal's mapLoginErrorMessage is a good pattern — extend it.

[MEDIUM] A13-7: Admin main.ts mount-error handler uses innerHTML interpolation RETIRED

• File: apps/admin/ (removed)
• Description: The admin SPA has been retired. Its functionality now lives in apps/app/ under /platform/* routes.
• Resolution: Finding no longer applicable — apps/admin/ has been removed.

[MEDIUM] A13-8: Portal localStorage event state persists across session expiry

• File: apps/portal/src/stores/usePortalStore.ts:9-34,86-94
• Description: Event data and registration state stored in localStorage survives logout (partially cleared).
• Risk: Stale data from previous sessions could contaminate new sessions.
• Fix: Verify reset() is called on all logout paths including token expiry via 401 interceptor.

[LOW] A13-9: No Content Security Policy on any SPA — RESOLVED

• File: apps/app/index.html, apps/portal/index.html, api/app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php, deploy/nginx/
• Description: Neither app set a CSP meta tag or header.
• Risk: Injected scripts have unrestricted access.
• Resolution: API CSP enforced via SecurityHeaders middleware (default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'). SPA CSP configured via Nginx snippets (deploy/nginx/csp-spa.conf, csp-portal.conf). Dev CSP meta tags added to all index.html files for local testing. See deploy/README.md for rollout instructions.
• WS-7 follow-up (mei 2026): SPA connect-src whitelists the GlitchTip event-ingest endpoint as an explicit security control — dev http://localhost:8200, prod https://monitoring.hausdesign.nl (RFC-WS-7 §3.5). This restricts outgoing observability traffic to a single known host; without it, the strict CSP would either silently drop events (PR-3 regression) or — if loosened blindly — allow exfiltration to arbitrary hosts. Regression-guard: tests/Feature/Security/CspConnectsToObservabilityTest.php reads both the dev meta tag and the production nginx config and asserts the host is present.

[LOW] A13-10: No hardcoded secrets found in frontend code (positive)

• Description: No API keys, secrets, or credentials found in .env.local files or source code. .env.local files correctly gitignored.

---

WS-7 Observability — finale audit (mei 2026)

Acceptance criteria

Alle 14 criteria uit RFC-WS-7-OBSERVABILITY.md §6 zijn geadresseerd:

#	Criterium	Status
1	GlitchTip op monitoring.hausdesign.nl met TLS + 2FA	Bert-handmatig (deploy-checklist)
2	Twee projecten + DSNs in 1Password vault	Bert-handmatig (deploy-checklist)
3	Laravel SDK geïntegreerd; errors uit prod-API verschijnen <60s	✅ PR-2
4	apps/app SDK geïntegreerd; errors met org/user/release context; portal-routes strict scrub	✅ PR-3
5	Sourcemaps upload werkt; leesbare stack traces; .map afwezig in publieke bundle	✅ PR-3 (deploy.sh)
6	PII scrubbing-tests groen (backend + frontend)	✅ PR-2 + PR-3
7	Smoke test induced 500 in staging	Bert-handmatig (deploy-checklist)
8	ARCH-OBSERVABILITY.md geschreven (WS-8b)	✅ PR-4
9	Email-alerting geconfigureerd + getest	Bert-handmatig (GlitchTip UI configuratie)
10	Retention-policy 90 dagen toegepast	Bert-handmatig (GlitchTip admin)
11	Daily postgres-backup-script in place	✅ PR-1
12	Activity_log indexes (D-06) gemigreerd	✅ Pre-existing (Spatie default nullableMorphs); regression-guard tests/Feature/Database/ActivityLogIndexesTest.php
13	Structured logging conventie geïmplementeerd; X-Request-Id round-trip getest	✅ PR-2
14	SECURITY_AUDIT.md bijgewerkt	✅ This entry

Processing register

GlitchTip is opgenomen in Crewli's processing register als zelfstandig verwerkingsproces:

• Doel: defectdetectie en service-availability monitoring.
• Categorieën persoonsgegevens: pseudonieme identifiers (ULIDs voor user/organisation/event), technische metadata (route names, HTTP methods, stack traces zonder locals).
• Bron: geautomatiseerd captured uit Laravel API en apps/app SPA bij programmer/infra errors.
• Ontvanger: alleen Bert (single super_admin met 2FA op GlitchTip web-UI).
• Bewaartermijn: 90 dagen, daarna automatisch gepurged door GlitchTip's eigen partition-maintenance loop.
• Beveiligingsmaatregelen: TLS in transit, full-disk encryption at rest, SSH-key + 2FA op web-UI.
• Controller / processor: Crewli is controller. Self-hosted op Crewli-infra; geen processor-relatie of DPA-uitbreiding nodig.
• Procedure right to erasure (Art. 17): zie runbooks/observability-erasure.md.

Security controls die WS-7 introduceert

1. PII scrubbing op events (back + front). SentryEventScrubber (PHP) en scrubEvent (TypeScript) strippen sensitive body-keys, headers, query-params, cookies, en form_values voordat events naar GlitchTip gestuurd worden. Regression-guards: tests/Feature/Observability/PiiScrubbingTest.php (20 cases) en apps/app/src/observability/__tests__/scrubber.spec.ts (18 cases).

2. CSP connect-src whitelist voor named ingest host. Outgoing Sentry-events zijn beperkt tot localhost:8200 (dev) en monitoring.hausdesign.nl (prod). Geen exfiltration mogelijk naar arbitrary hosts. Regression-guard: tests/Feature/Security/CspConnectsToObservabilityTest.php. Zie ook A13-9 hierboven.

3. Sourcemap upload-only, never public-mapped. deploy.sh upload sourcemaps naar GlitchTip vóór find apps/app/dist -name '*.map' -delete. Stack-traces leesbaar in GlitchTip UI; geen .map bestanden bereikbaar via productie-bundle. Default soft-fail op upload faalt zodat deploy doorgaat (unmapped frames in GlitchTip is acceptabel; geblokkeerde deploy niet).

4. Listener registration discipline. Auto-discovery uitgeschakeld; alle observability listeners expliciet geregistreerd in AppServiceProvider::boot() met array-callable form. Regression-guard: tests/Feature/Observability/EventListenerRegistrationTest.php (BACKLOG OBS-8). Voorkomt silent double-emission die op een toekomstig moment additive operations zou breken.

5. Runtime context-split portal/organizer. Frontend portal-zone (route.meta.public === true && route.meta.context === 'portal') krijgt geen user_id of username op events. RFC §3.7 frontend- block punt 5 — ULID-tokens voor token-based access (artist advance, public form fill) blijven uit GlitchTip-events. Regression-guard: apps/app/src/observability/__tests__/contextBinding.spec.ts (cross-zone leak test).

6. Multi-tenant invariant op tag-niveau. actor_scope=organisation impliceert valide ULID organisation_id; actor_scope=platform impliceert geen organisation_id (forced fallback zou misleidend zijn). Regression-guard: AuthScopeContextListenerTest::test_organisation_id_present_when_actor_scope_is_organisation.

7. impersonation.active always-present binary signal. Default- in-listener ('false') + override-in-middleware ('true') pattern garandeert dat élke authenticated event een binary signal voor filtering heeft. Regression-guard: AuthScopeContextListenerTest::test_impersonation_active_default_false_across_every_actor_scope_branch.

Pointer naar Art. 17 procedure

GDPR right-to-erasure verzoeken voor GlitchTip-data: zie runbooks/observability-erasure.md voor stap-voor-stap procedure. Geautomatiseerd erasure-script staat op BACKLOG; tot dan handmatige psql-procedure met audit-trail verplichting.

---

Positive Findings

The following security measures ARE correctly implemented:

1. Password hashing: bcrypt with BCRYPT_ROUNDS=12. $password in User model's $hidden array.
2. CORS origins: Correctly restricted to two specific SPA origins (not *). supports_credentials: true set.
3. SQL injection prevention: All Eloquent queries use PDO parameter binding. All whereRaw()/selectRaw() calls use ? placeholders.
4. No shell execution: No exec(), shell_exec(), system(), proc_open(), or passthru() in application code.
5. Blade escaping: All Blade output uses {{ }} (escaped). Zero instances of {!! !!}.
6. CSRF: Intentionally disabled for stateless token-based API — correct architecture.
7. File uploads: Validated for type, mime, and size. Server-generated filenames prevent path traversal.
8. Lock files: composer.lock and all pnpm-lock.yaml files committed.
9. Password reset throttling: auth/forgot-password has throttle:5,1.
10. Check-email throttling: public/check-email has throttle:10,1.
11. Debug output gated: Exception handler correctly gates debug info behind config('app.debug').
12. No Telescope/Horizon exposed: Not installed in the application.
13. Invitation expiry: Invitations expire after 7 days and are checked for pending status + expires_at.
14. Activity logging: spatie/laravel-activitylog in use for invitation and volunteer registration flows.
15. Policy coverage: 16 policies exist covering all major models. Controllers consistently use Gate::authorize().
16. No external HTTP calls: No outbound HTTP client usage in application code — no SSRF surface.

---

Priority Remediation Plan

Immediate (before any production deployment)

Priority	Finding	Fix effort
1	A04-2: Rate limit login	One line
2	A04-3: Rate limit portal/token-auth	One line
3	A04-4: API resources for portal/token-auth response	Small
4	A04-1: Remove billing_status from UpdateOrganisationRequest	One line
5	A02-2: Set Sanctum token expiration	One line
6	A02-1: Replace ULID tokens with cryptographic random	Small
7	A01-1: Implement PortalTokenMiddleware	Medium
8	A13-3: Fix open redirect on login pages ✅ resolved by WS-3 PR-B2b	Small

Short-term (within 1 sprint)

Priority	Finding	Fix effort
9	A01-2/3: Add event boundary checks in portal shift + policy	Small
10	A01-5/6/7/8/9: Scope all exists: rules to org/event	Medium
11	A01-4: Register OrganisationScope on models	Medium
12	A04-5/6/7: Clean up $fillable on Person, ShiftAssignment, UserInvitation	Small
13	A07-2: Revoke tokens on password reset	One line
14	A05-1: Add security headers middleware	Small
15	A06-1/2: Upgrade @casl/ability and axios	Small
16	A13-1: Migrate token storage to httpOnly cookies	Medium

Medium-term (within 2-3 sprints)

Priority	Finding	Fix effort
17	A01-13: Move event routes under org prefix	Large
18	A09-1/2/3: Add security logging	Medium
19	A07-3: Strengthen password rules	Small
20	A13-2/5: Fix admin cookie security RETIRED (apps/admin removed)	N/A
21	A06-3: Upgrade swiper (major version)	Medium