Three verification methods (TOTP authenticator, email code, backup codes),
trusted device management with 30-day expiry, role-based enforcement for
super_admin and org_admin, admin reset capability, and full test coverage
(46 tests). Modifies login flow to support MFA challenge/response with
temporary session tokens stored in cache.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The admin SPA (apps/admin/) has been retired. Its functionality now
lives in apps/app/ under /platform/* routes for super_admin users.
Updated all documentation to reflect: 2 SPAs instead of 3, removed
FRONTEND_ADMIN_URL/port 5173 references, changed production URL from
app.crewli.app to crewli.app. Retired admin-specific security audit
findings (A13-2, A13-4, A13-5, A13-7) and APPS-01 backlog item.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause: browsers don't scope cookies by port. With SESSION_DOMAIN=
localhost, all three SPAs share cookies. The CookieBearerToken middleware
iterated all cookie names and picked the first match, so logging into
the organizer app (port 5174) also authenticated the portal (port 5175).
Fix: CookieBearerToken now resolves the correct cookie name from the
Origin header (same logic as SetAuthCookie trait). It only reads the
cookie matching the requesting app — portal origin reads only
crewli_portal_token, app origin reads only crewli_app_token, etc.
Falls back to first-available cookie when no Origin header is present
(server-to-server requests, tests without explicit Origin).
Added 3 cross-app isolation tests:
- app cookie does NOT authenticate portal requests
- portal cookie does NOT authenticate app requests
- correct cookie + matching origin = authenticated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- CookieBearerToken middleware reads httpOnly cookie and injects Authorization
header before Sanctum validates (prepended to API middleware group)
- SetAuthCookie trait provides cookie creation/expiry helpers with per-app
cookie names (crewli_admin_token, crewli_app_token, crewli_portal_token)
- LoginController sets token via Set-Cookie, removes it from JSON body
- LogoutController expires the auth cookie on logout
- AuthRefreshController (POST /auth/refresh) rotates tokens with new cookie
- InvitationController accept also sets token via cookie, not JSON body
- All cookies: httpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure (in production)
Frontend (all three SPAs):
- Removed all localStorage token storage (apps/app, apps/portal)
- Removed all JS-readable cookie token storage (apps/admin)
- Removed Authorization: Bearer header interceptors from axios
- Auth stores now rely on GET /auth/me to validate httpOnly cookie
- Admin app: new Pinia auth store replaces useCookie-based auth pattern
- withCredentials: true ensures browser sends cookies automatically
Fixes security findings A13-1 (localStorage tokens) and A13-2 (admin
cookie flags). Tokens are now invisible to JavaScript.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
