PR-3 follow-up. Live smoke surfaced that the @sentry/vue SDK was
running correctly and emitting events, but Crewli's strict
connect-src directive blocked every POST at the browser layer. No
fallback — events evaporated silently with a CSP-violation log in
DevTools console only.
Updated locations (audited the CSP surface; only two locations actually
need the whitelist):
- apps/app/index.html — dev meta CSP, adds http://localhost:8200 to
connect-src so local dev hits the docker-compose GlitchTip stack.
- deploy/nginx/csp-spa.conf — prod organizer SPA CSP, adds
https://monitoring.hausdesign.nl to BOTH the report-only and enforce
add_header lines so a future flip between modes can't silently break
observability.
NOT updated (deviation from prompt):
- api/config/security.php — the API CSP is `default-src 'none';
frame-ancestors 'none'` for JSON responses. Browsers don't enforce
connect-src on JSON contexts (no document, no fetch origin). Adding
connect-src would be semantically a no-op and confuse the deny-by-
default policy.
Regression guard: tests/Feature/Security/CspConnectsToObservabilityTest.
Reads both the dev meta tag and the prod nginx conf directly (the SPA's
CSP is not Laravel-served, so $this->get() can't reach it). Apply-with-
revert verified: stashing both fixes makes both cases fail with a clear
"Refused to connect because it violates the following CSP directive"
hint; popping the stash restores green.
SECURITY_AUDIT.md A13-9 updated with a WS-7 follow-up note documenting
the GlitchTip whitelist as an explicit security control: outgoing
observability traffic restricted to a single known host.
Test count 1549 to 1551. Larastan + Pint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Vuexy loads fonts via webfontloader from fonts.googleapis.com and
fonts.gstatic.com. The previous CSP blocked these, causing a white screen.
- style-src: added https://fonts.googleapis.com
- font-src: added https://fonts.gstatic.com
- Removed frame-ancestors from meta tags (ignored in meta, console warnings)
Updated in all three index.html dev meta tags and both Nginx SPA/portal configs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
API middleware:
- SecurityHeaders now sets Content-Security-Policy from config/security.php
- Default API policy: "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'"
- Supports report-only mode via CSP_REPORT_ONLY env var
- Policy value configurable via CSP_POLICY env var
Nginx deployment configs (deploy/nginx/):
- security-headers.conf: shared headers for all server blocks
- csp-api.conf: restrictive JSON-only policy for api.crewli.app
- csp-spa.conf: SPA policy for app/admin (self + unsafe-inline styles)
- csp-portal.conf: portal policy matching SPA
Development:
- CSP meta tags added to all three index.html files
- Includes 'unsafe-inline' + 'unsafe-eval' for Vite HMR/loader script
- Each app allows its own ws:// port for HMR websocket
Resolves security finding A13-9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
