Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
940297f214 security: implement CSP headers (API middleware + Nginx configs + dev meta tags)
API middleware:
- SecurityHeaders now sets Content-Security-Policy from config/security.php
- Default API policy: "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'"
- Supports report-only mode via CSP_REPORT_ONLY env var
- Policy value configurable via CSP_POLICY env var

Nginx deployment configs (deploy/nginx/):
- security-headers.conf: shared headers for all server blocks
- csp-api.conf: restrictive JSON-only policy for api.crewli.app
- csp-spa.conf: SPA policy for app/admin (self + unsafe-inline styles)
- csp-portal.conf: portal policy matching SPA

Development:
- CSP meta tags added to all three index.html files
- Includes 'unsafe-inline' + 'unsafe-eval' for Vite HMR/loader script
- Each app allows its own ws:// port for HMR websocket

Resolves security finding A13-9.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-14 16:14:37 +02:00
513ca519b2 security: migrate auth tokens to httpOnly cookies (hybrid bearer token approach)
Backend:
- CookieBearerToken middleware reads httpOnly cookie and injects Authorization
  header before Sanctum validates (prepended to API middleware group)
- SetAuthCookie trait provides cookie creation/expiry helpers with per-app
  cookie names (crewli_admin_token, crewli_app_token, crewli_portal_token)
- LoginController sets token via Set-Cookie, removes it from JSON body
- LogoutController expires the auth cookie on logout
- AuthRefreshController (POST /auth/refresh) rotates tokens with new cookie
- InvitationController accept also sets token via cookie, not JSON body
- All cookies: httpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure (in production)

Frontend (all three SPAs):
- Removed all localStorage token storage (apps/app, apps/portal)
- Removed all JS-readable cookie token storage (apps/admin)
- Removed Authorization: Bearer header interceptors from axios
- Auth stores now rely on GET /auth/me to validate httpOnly cookie
- Admin app: new Pinia auth store replaces useCookie-based auth pattern
- withCredentials: true ensures browser sends cookies automatically

Fixes security findings A13-1 (localStorage tokens) and A13-2 (admin
cookie flags). Tokens are now invisible to JavaScript.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-14 16:06:44 +02:00
51e5dd6fcb security: comprehensive security regression test suite
61 tests across 4 test files covering all OWASP categories:

MultiTenancyIsolationTest (19 tests):
- Cross-org event, person, shift, section, time-slot, location,
  registration field, shift assignment, crowd list access
- Cross-org FK references (crowd_type, company, parent_event)
- Bulk operation isolation, invitation revocation
- Portal cross-event access prevention

AuthenticationSecurityTest (15 tests):
- Rate limiting: login (5/min), portal token-auth (10/min),
  invitation show (10/min)
- Account enumeration prevention: generic error on failed login,
  200 response on password reset for unknown email
- Token lifecycle: logout revokes token, password reset revokes
  all tokens, expired tokens rejected (7-day config verified)
- Password strength: weak/no-uppercase/no-numbers rejected
- Security headers present on all responses
- Protected routes require authentication

PortalTokenSecurityTest (10 tests):
- Invalid/empty/missing token handling
- Response shape: only safe fields (no milestones, no portal_token,
  no organisation_id, no internal event fields)
- Hash-based lookup: plain token works, hash does not
- Error messages: no schema/table info leakage
- Middleware: rejects without token, rejects invalid, accepts valid,
  rejects draft event status

InputValidationSecurityTest (17 tests):
- XSS payloads stored safely in person name, event name, section name
- Oversized inputs rejected (name >255, remarks >5000)
- Invalid enum values rejected (status, event_type)
- Cross-org FK references rejected (crowd_type, company, location,
  parent_event, person assignment)
- Invalid/nonexistent ULID format rejected
- SQL injection payloads harmless (PDO binding verified)

Also fixes PortalTokenMiddleware to use request->attributes->set()
instead of request->merge() for stdClass objects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-14 07:25:47 +02:00
52f6380ac0 security: round 3 — token security (crypto random, hashed storage, portal middleware)
Token generation:
- Replace Str::ulid() with bin2hex(random_bytes(32)) for 256-bit entropy
- Store SHA-256 hash in database, never plaintext tokens
- Hash input before lookup on all token endpoints

Invitation tokens:
- InvitationService: generate crypto random, store hash, pass plain
  token transiently for email URL via UserInvitation::$plainToken
- InvitationController show/accept: hash input before DB lookup
- AcceptInvitationRequest: hash token before invitation lookup
- Migration: widen user_invitations.token and artists.portal_token
  from char(26) to char(64) for SHA-256 hex digests

Portal token auth:
- PortalTokenController: remove Schema::hasTable() runtime checks,
  hash token before lookup, return shaped response via PortalEventResource
  instead of raw model data
- Create PortalEventResource (name, dates, status only — no internals)
- Handle missing production_requests table gracefully via try/catch

Portal token middleware:
- Implement full token validation: extract from Bearer header or ?token=
  query param, hash, look up in artists/production_requests, verify
  event exists and is not draft/closed, set portal context on request
- Return generic 401 on any failure (no information leakage)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-14 06:52:54 +02:00
1028498705 security: round 1 — quick wins (rate limiting, headers, mass assignment, logging)
- Add throttle middleware to login (5/min), portal/token-auth (10/min),
  volunteer-register (5/min), and invitation routes (10/min)
- Set Sanctum token expiration to 7 days
- Remove billing_status from UpdateOrganisationRequest (super_admin only)
- Revoke all Sanctum tokens on password reset
- Strengthen password rules: min 8 chars, mixed case, numbers
- Create SecurityHeaders middleware (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options,
  HSTS, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)
- Fix open redirect on all 3 login pages (validate ?to= starts with /)
- Set APP_DEBUG=false in .env.example
- Log failed login attempts with email, IP, user-agent
- Log authorization failures (403) with user, IP, path, method
- Harden mass assignment: remove user_id from Person, audit fields from
  ShiftAssignment, system fields from UserInvitation $fillable
- Replace real DB records with factory make() in mail preview routes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-14 01:34:51 +02:00
1cb7674d52 refactor: align codebase with EventCrew domain and trim legacy band stack
- Update API: events, users, policies, routes, resources, migrations
- Remove deprecated models/resources (customers, setlists, invitations, etc.)
- Refresh admin app and docs; remove apps/band

Made-with: Cursor
2026-03-29 23:19:06 +02:00