The dual-cookie machinery (crewli_app_token + crewli_portal_token,
Origin-based resolution) was load-bearing only when the second SPA
existed. apps/portal/ was deleted in WS-3 PR-B1; the resolver code
has been carrying dead branches since then. Collapse to one cookie.
Cookie name retained as crewli_app_token — no session breakage on
deploy. crewli_portal_token is fully purged from the server-side.
CookieBearerToken middleware:
- COOKIE_NAMES array → single COOKIE_NAME constant
- resolveCookieName method (Origin/Referer parsing, host+port
matching against frontend_app_url/frontend_portal_url) → removed
- Body collapses to: skip if Authorization header present; else
read crewli_app_token cookie and inject Bearer header
SetAuthCookie trait:
- COOKIE_MAP / resolveCookieName / originMatches → removed
- makeAuthCookie / forgetAuthCookie now take only $token; the
cookie name is the trait's private constant
Five callers updated to drop the resolveCookieName($request) line
and the cookie-name argument: LoginController (3 sites),
MfaVerifyController (1 site), AuthRefreshController (1 site),
LogoutController (1 site), InvitationController (1 site — caller
list in the prompt missed this one but the same pattern applies).
frontend_portal_url config key retained (per Phase A directive Q1):
EmailChangeController, PasswordResetController, PersonController are
non-auth consumers that build per-app URL maps for outbound emails.
The map structure is now functionally redundant (production resolves
all FRONTEND_* env vars to the same host) but stays structurally
intact. Refactor tracked as TECH-FRONTEND-URL-CONSOLIDATE in the
upcoming docs commit.
HttpOnlyCookieAuthTest:
- Removed 4 dual-cookie tests (login_sets_portal_cookie_for_portal_origin,
app_cookie_does_not_authenticate_portal_requests,
portal_cookie_does_not_authenticate_app_requests,
correct_cookie_authenticates_with_matching_origin)
- Renamed login_sets_app_cookie_for_unknown_origin →
login_sets_app_cookie_regardless_of_origin; expanded to four
Origin variants (none, app, unknown, foreign) — pins the new
origin-agnostic contract
- Removed Origin headers from request calls in remaining tests
(now meaningless)
Backend test count: 1491 → 1487 (-4 deleted, dual-cookie tests
encoding the obsolete contract). Pint clean. Larastan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- CookieBearerToken middleware reads httpOnly cookie and injects Authorization
header before Sanctum validates (prepended to API middleware group)
- SetAuthCookie trait provides cookie creation/expiry helpers with per-app
cookie names (crewli_admin_token, crewli_app_token, crewli_portal_token)
- LoginController sets token via Set-Cookie, removes it from JSON body
- LogoutController expires the auth cookie on logout
- AuthRefreshController (POST /auth/refresh) rotates tokens with new cookie
- InvitationController accept also sets token via cookie, not JSON body
- All cookies: httpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure (in production)
Frontend (all three SPAs):
- Removed all localStorage token storage (apps/app, apps/portal)
- Removed all JS-readable cookie token storage (apps/admin)
- Removed Authorization: Bearer header interceptors from axios
- Auth stores now rely on GET /auth/me to validate httpOnly cookie
- Admin app: new Pinia auth store replaces useCookie-based auth pattern
- withCredentials: true ensures browser sends cookies automatically
Fixes security findings A13-1 (localStorage tokens) and A13-2 (admin
cookie flags). Tokens are now invisible to JavaScript.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Token generation:
- Replace Str::ulid() with bin2hex(random_bytes(32)) for 256-bit entropy
- Store SHA-256 hash in database, never plaintext tokens
- Hash input before lookup on all token endpoints
Invitation tokens:
- InvitationService: generate crypto random, store hash, pass plain
token transiently for email URL via UserInvitation::$plainToken
- InvitationController show/accept: hash input before DB lookup
- AcceptInvitationRequest: hash token before invitation lookup
- Migration: widen user_invitations.token and artists.portal_token
from char(26) to char(64) for SHA-256 hex digests
Portal token auth:
- PortalTokenController: remove Schema::hasTable() runtime checks,
hash token before lookup, return shaped response via PortalEventResource
instead of raw model data
- Create PortalEventResource (name, dates, status only — no internals)
- Handle missing production_requests table gracefully via try/catch
Portal token middleware:
- Implement full token validation: extract from Bearer header or ?token=
query param, hash, look up in artists/production_requests, verify
event exists and is not draft/closed, set portal context on request
- Return generic 401 on any failure (no information leakage)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cross-cutting migration affecting the entire stack:
- Database: 3 migrations splitting name columns with data migration
- Models: first_name/last_name on User, Person; contact_first_name/contact_last_name on Company; backward-compatible name accessors
- API: all resources return first_name, last_name, full_name; assignablePersons endpoint updated
- Requests: validation rules updated for all person/user/company forms
- Services: VolunteerRegistrationService, ShiftAssignmentService, InvitationService updated
- Frontend: TypeScript types, Zod schemas, all forms split into Voornaam/Achternaam fields
- Display: all person/user name references use full_name; initials use first_name[0]+last_name[0]
- Tests: all 371 tests passing
- Docs: SCHEMA.md and API.md updated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
