RFC v0.2 R1 — Idempotency-Key replay window for POST
/api/v1/events/{event}/timetable/move. Narrow scope by design: the
12-hour ARCH §10 default would let a cached cascade-bump response
overwrite a fresh edit; 60 seconds covers honest network retry but
expires before a meaningful conflict can emerge.
Backed by the Laravel Cache facade (Redis in non-test env). Cache key
namespace `idempotency:60s:*` distinct from FormSubmission's
DB-column idempotency. Replays carry an `Idempotency-Replayed: true`
header so observability can distinguish them.
Registered as the route-middleware alias `idempotency.60s` in
bootstrap/app.php; will be applied on the move route in Step 8.
Missing or empty Idempotency-Key returns 400 with
`{"error":"idempotency_key_required"}`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
RFC-TIMETABLE v0.2 §5.3 moved portal_token from artists to
artist_engagements (one master artist may have multiple per-event
portal links). PortalTokenController and PortalTokenMiddleware
queried the now-removed artists.portal_token column.
Update both lookups to query artist_engagements.portal_token, joining
to artists for the master name. Response shape unchanged: data.id =
engagement id, data.name = artist name, data.booking_status = engagement
status. Middleware sets portal_context='artist' (unchanged); the
attached portal_person object now carries the engagement row.
PortalTokenSecurityTest seeds artist_engagement rows via a private
helper that writes both an Artist (master) and an artist_engagements
row with the hashed token; test assertions adjusted to check the new
shape (no more milestone fields exposed since they don't exist on
the engagement).
Out of scope refactor disclaimer: this is a forced schema-migration
follow-up, not a Session 2-style controller refactor — the controller
queries the new table with minimal change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sentry-context binding split into two responsibilities:
- Route-scope (app, http.method, route_name) stays in middleware on
the api group as BindSentryRouteContext — works on every request,
no auth required.
- Auth-scope (user_id, actor_type) moves to AuthScopeContextListener
on Illuminate\Auth\Events\Authenticated — works on every
authentication mechanism (Sanctum, portal-tokens, future
authenticators) without per-route middleware-attachment. Listener
also augments Log::withContext with user_id (closes OBS-2).
Architecturally fault-preventing rather than fault-detecting: new
authenticated route groups need no separate sentry.context aliasing,
so silent observability gaps are no longer possible (closes OBS-3).
Impersonation tagging is co-located with HandleImpersonation: after
the user-swap, the middleware re-tags Sentry scope with the target
user_id/actor_type and adds impersonation.active /
impersonation.impersonator_user_id / impersonation.session_id. The
Authenticated event fires for the admin (Sanctum's natural flow),
the listener tags the admin, then HandleImpersonation overwrites
post-swap.
Files renamed:
- BindSentryContext -> BindSentryRouteContext (route-scope only)
- BindSentryContextTest -> BindSentryRouteContextTest (4 cases)
Files added:
- AuthScopeContextListener
- AuthScopeContextListenerTest (6 cases)
bootstrap/app.php drops the sentry.context alias and prepends
BindSentryRouteContext to the api group. routes/api.php drops every
sentry.context middleware string from auth:sanctum groups.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WS-7 PR-2 commit 3. RFC §3.13.
- app/Http/Middleware/BindRequestLogContext.php: tags every Laravel log
line written during the request with request_id, organisation_id,
user_id, and route name. Sets X-Request-Id on the response so the
SPA can correlate to backend log lines via one click.
- Client-supplied X-Request-Id is honoured only if it parses as a ULID
via Str::isUlid. Junk input (empty, non-ULID) is rejected and a
fresh ULID is generated server-side.
- Registered as a global api-group middleware via the prepend list so
it runs before authentication. Unauthenticated 4xx responses still
carry the X-Request-Id header.
- Test count: 1523 to 1532. Larastan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WS-7 PR-2 commit 2.
- app/Http/Middleware/BindSentryContext.php: sets RFC §3.6 tags on the
active Sentry scope (app, http.method, route_name, actor_type,
user_id, organisation_id, event_id, impersonation). Multi-tenant
invariant: throws RuntimeException in local/testing when an auth
request to a tenant-scoped route lacks organisation_id; logs a
warning in production so the user flow still completes.
- app/Listeners/Observability/TagJobAttemptOnSentry.php: tags
queue.attempt on the scope from the JobProcessing event. Default
stack-trace grouping preserved per §3.11.
- ActorType: VOLUNTEER case reserved for a future role split. Current
resolver maps non-admin authenticated users to ORG_MEMBER.
- bootstrap/app.php: registers sentry.context alias. Applied inside
auth:sanctum groups in routes/api.php so it runs after auth.
- AppServiceProvider::boot registers the queue listener.
Test count: 1507 to 1523. Larastan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dual-cookie machinery (crewli_app_token + crewli_portal_token,
Origin-based resolution) was load-bearing only when the second SPA
existed. apps/portal/ was deleted in WS-3 PR-B1; the resolver code
has been carrying dead branches since then. Collapse to one cookie.
Cookie name retained as crewli_app_token — no session breakage on
deploy. crewli_portal_token is fully purged from the server-side.
CookieBearerToken middleware:
- COOKIE_NAMES array → single COOKIE_NAME constant
- resolveCookieName method (Origin/Referer parsing, host+port
matching against frontend_app_url/frontend_portal_url) → removed
- Body collapses to: skip if Authorization header present; else
read crewli_app_token cookie and inject Bearer header
SetAuthCookie trait:
- COOKIE_MAP / resolveCookieName / originMatches → removed
- makeAuthCookie / forgetAuthCookie now take only $token; the
cookie name is the trait's private constant
Five callers updated to drop the resolveCookieName($request) line
and the cookie-name argument: LoginController (3 sites),
MfaVerifyController (1 site), AuthRefreshController (1 site),
LogoutController (1 site), InvitationController (1 site — caller
list in the prompt missed this one but the same pattern applies).
frontend_portal_url config key retained (per Phase A directive Q1):
EmailChangeController, PasswordResetController, PersonController are
non-auth consumers that build per-app URL maps for outbound emails.
The map structure is now functionally redundant (production resolves
all FRONTEND_* env vars to the same host) but stays structurally
intact. Refactor tracked as TECH-FRONTEND-URL-CONSOLIDATE in the
upcoming docs commit.
HttpOnlyCookieAuthTest:
- Removed 4 dual-cookie tests (login_sets_portal_cookie_for_portal_origin,
app_cookie_does_not_authenticate_portal_requests,
portal_cookie_does_not_authenticate_app_requests,
correct_cookie_authenticates_with_matching_origin)
- Renamed login_sets_app_cookie_for_unknown_origin →
login_sets_app_cookie_regardless_of_origin; expanded to four
Origin variants (none, app, unknown, foreign) — pins the new
origin-agnostic contract
- Removed Origin headers from request calls in remaining tests
(now meaningless)
Backend test count: 1491 → 1487 (-4 deleted, dual-cookie tests
encoding the obsolete contract). Pint clean. Larastan clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Banner: white elevated button for contrast, fixed 48px height,
layout top padding offset so content isn't obscured
- Middleware: allow GET me/profile (viewing), block mutations only;
add auth/refresh to blocked routes
- Navigation: hide Platform section during impersonation; hide
org-dependent items when impersonated user has no organisation
- Test: add read-only routes allowed test, auth/refresh blocked test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause: browsers don't scope cookies by port. With SESSION_DOMAIN=
localhost, all three SPAs share cookies. The CookieBearerToken middleware
iterated all cookie names and picked the first match, so logging into
the organizer app (port 5174) also authenticated the portal (port 5175).
Fix: CookieBearerToken now resolves the correct cookie name from the
Origin header (same logic as SetAuthCookie trait). It only reads the
cookie matching the requesting app — portal origin reads only
crewli_portal_token, app origin reads only crewli_app_token, etc.
Falls back to first-available cookie when no Origin header is present
(server-to-server requests, tests without explicit Origin).
Added 3 cross-app isolation tests:
- app cookie does NOT authenticate portal requests
- portal cookie does NOT authenticate app requests
- correct cookie + matching origin = authenticated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
API middleware:
- SecurityHeaders now sets Content-Security-Policy from config/security.php
- Default API policy: "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'"
- Supports report-only mode via CSP_REPORT_ONLY env var
- Policy value configurable via CSP_POLICY env var
Nginx deployment configs (deploy/nginx/):
- security-headers.conf: shared headers for all server blocks
- csp-api.conf: restrictive JSON-only policy for api.crewli.app
- csp-spa.conf: SPA policy for app/admin (self + unsafe-inline styles)
- csp-portal.conf: portal policy matching SPA
Development:
- CSP meta tags added to all three index.html files
- Includes 'unsafe-inline' + 'unsafe-eval' for Vite HMR/loader script
- Each app allows its own ws:// port for HMR websocket
Resolves security finding A13-9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- CookieBearerToken middleware reads httpOnly cookie and injects Authorization
header before Sanctum validates (prepended to API middleware group)
- SetAuthCookie trait provides cookie creation/expiry helpers with per-app
cookie names (crewli_admin_token, crewli_app_token, crewli_portal_token)
- LoginController sets token via Set-Cookie, removes it from JSON body
- LogoutController expires the auth cookie on logout
- AuthRefreshController (POST /auth/refresh) rotates tokens with new cookie
- InvitationController accept also sets token via cookie, not JSON body
- All cookies: httpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Secure (in production)
Frontend (all three SPAs):
- Removed all localStorage token storage (apps/app, apps/portal)
- Removed all JS-readable cookie token storage (apps/admin)
- Removed Authorization: Bearer header interceptors from axios
- Auth stores now rely on GET /auth/me to validate httpOnly cookie
- Admin app: new Pinia auth store replaces useCookie-based auth pattern
- withCredentials: true ensures browser sends cookies automatically
Fixes security findings A13-1 (localStorage tokens) and A13-2 (admin
cookie flags). Tokens are now invisible to JavaScript.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Token generation:
- Replace Str::ulid() with bin2hex(random_bytes(32)) for 256-bit entropy
- Store SHA-256 hash in database, never plaintext tokens
- Hash input before lookup on all token endpoints
Invitation tokens:
- InvitationService: generate crypto random, store hash, pass plain
token transiently for email URL via UserInvitation::$plainToken
- InvitationController show/accept: hash input before DB lookup
- AcceptInvitationRequest: hash token before invitation lookup
- Migration: widen user_invitations.token and artists.portal_token
from char(26) to char(64) for SHA-256 hex digests
Portal token auth:
- PortalTokenController: remove Schema::hasTable() runtime checks,
hash token before lookup, return shaped response via PortalEventResource
instead of raw model data
- Create PortalEventResource (name, dates, status only — no internals)
- Handle missing production_requests table gracefully via try/catch
Portal token middleware:
- Implement full token validation: extract from Bearer header or ?token=
query param, hash, look up in artists/production_requests, verify
event exists and is not draft/closed, set portal context on request
- Return generic 401 on any failure (no information leakage)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add throttle middleware to login (5/min), portal/token-auth (10/min),
volunteer-register (5/min), and invitation routes (10/min)
- Set Sanctum token expiration to 7 days
- Remove billing_status from UpdateOrganisationRequest (super_admin only)
- Revoke all Sanctum tokens on password reset
- Strengthen password rules: min 8 chars, mixed case, numbers
- Create SecurityHeaders middleware (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options,
HSTS, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)
- Fix open redirect on all 3 login pages (validate ?to= starts with /)
- Set APP_DEBUG=false in .env.example
- Log failed login attempts with email, IP, user-agent
- Log authorization failures (403) with user, IP, path, method
- Harden mass assignment: remove user_id from Person, audit fields from
ShiftAssignment, system fields from UserInvitation $fillable
- Replace real DB records with factory make() in mail preview routes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
