security: round 3 — token security (crypto random, hashed storage, portal middleware)
Token generation: - Replace Str::ulid() with bin2hex(random_bytes(32)) for 256-bit entropy - Store SHA-256 hash in database, never plaintext tokens - Hash input before lookup on all token endpoints Invitation tokens: - InvitationService: generate crypto random, store hash, pass plain token transiently for email URL via UserInvitation::$plainToken - InvitationController show/accept: hash input before DB lookup - AcceptInvitationRequest: hash token before invitation lookup - Migration: widen user_invitations.token and artists.portal_token from char(26) to char(64) for SHA-256 hex digests Portal token auth: - PortalTokenController: remove Schema::hasTable() runtime checks, hash token before lookup, return shaped response via PortalEventResource instead of raw model data - Create PortalEventResource (name, dates, status only — no internals) - Handle missing production_requests table gracefully via try/catch Portal token middleware: - Implement full token validation: extract from Bearer header or ?token= query param, hash, look up in artists/production_requests, verify event exists and is not draft/closed, set portal context on request - Return generic 401 on any failure (no information leakage) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ if (app()->environment('local', 'staging')) {
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$invitation = UserInvitation::factory()->make();
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$invitation->setRelation('organisation', $organisation);
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$invitation->setRelation('invitedBy', User::factory()->make());
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$invitation->token ??= 'preview-token';
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$invitation->plainToken ??= 'preview-token';
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$invitation->role ??= 'org_member';
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$invitation->expires_at ??= now()->addDays(7);
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